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TWO GENERATIONS have passed since Louis Wirth (1938) publish-
ed his influential and controversial piece, &dquo;Urbanism as a Way of Life,&dquo;
which attempted to specify the universal features of urban places. Since then
his effort has often been criticized, yet the question of whether there are univer-
sals of urbanism continues to fascinate urban sociologists (see, for example,
Duncan 1957; Dewey 1960; Fischer 1976). In recent years the revival of in-
terest in Marxism among Western social scientists has led to a modified thesis
gaining some currency: features of urbanism such as those identified by Wirth
are inherent consequences of capitalism, but could be avoided in some socialist
cities (Castells 1977; Smith 1979). Also in recent years there has been a flurry
of interest in urban organization in the People’s Republic of China and some
suggestions that the Chinese Communists had, in fact, managed to establish a
new form of city life that avoided most &dquo;evils of urbanism.&dquo; (see Sidel 1974;
Cell 1979) We propose to consider here the Chinese case in a comparative con-
text in order to assess these various arguments.’ 1
When the Chinese Communists rode their rural revolution to power in
1949 they held a jaundiced view of the nature of the cities that fell to their ar-
mies. The list of &dquo;evils&dquo; used in characterizing Chinese cities resembles the
negative side of urbanism portrayed by Louis Wirth and by neo-Marxists to-
day. (Murphey 1980; Meisner 1974) To the Chinese Communists, cities were
strongholds of capitalism, private property, and market relationships. Formal
extraterritoriality had ended in 1943, but foreign ownership and influence were
substantial, including foreign textile and match factories, missionary-run
schools and the YMCA, and foreign styles of dress and American movies.
Poverty and unemployment were rampant, as the squatter settlements and the
carts that picked up dead bodies off the street each morning gave vivid
testimony. At the other end of the scale, urban elites engaged in conspicuous
consumption on a grand scale, and their offspring dominated the better schools
and jobs in the modern sector. Runaway inflation and the absence of job
security added to the insecurities of the urban populace. Within cities social
problems abounded, with crime, drug addiction, prostitution, gambling, beg-
ging and other phenomena perceived as social cancers by the Chinese Com-
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munists. Urban areas were perceived as characterized by impersonality,
dominance of the cash nexus, alienation, and acceptance of amoral competi-
tion for wealth or simply for survival - in Chinese parlance it was not a &dquo;dog
eat dog world&dquo; but a &dquo;man eat man world.&dquo;
When Mao Zedong launched his revolution from the caves of Yanan he
had not, so far as we can tell, had the pleasure of reading Louis Wirth. Even if
he had had that pleasure we can assume that he would have joined Wirth’s
critics, for revolutionaries do not like to be told that some things are universals
that cannot be changed. Mao and his colleagues developed a Marxist analysis
of urban problems and then, after 1949, found themselves in a position to put
their beliefs into practice. They set out to systematically reform the nature of
urban institutions in China with a view to eliminating those evils that had their
roots in capitalism and foreign influence. Many of the changes took place dur-
ing the 1950s, but it was not until the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-1976)
that this &dquo;Maoist model of urbanism&dquo; took its fullest form. Many of the
reforms introduced were similar to those implemented in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, but others, particularly in this latter period, were more
distinctive. In the following pages I will focus on the mid-I970s and analyze the
institutional changes that had been made and their social consequences. Where
appropriate, comparisons with other countries, especially the socialist coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, will be introduced.
Official Ideals and Institutional Changes
The Chinese Communist elites had a number of general ideals that guided
their thinking about urban transformation. They wanted their cities to be spar-
tan, productive, stable, solidary, tightly organized, and egalitarian. They felt
that such an environment would make urbanites feel secure, well provided for,
and involved, and that they would express their feelings through diligent work,
active political participation, and vigilance against crime, abuses of power, and
other forms of behaviour that were officially disapproved.
In their efforts to realize these ideals a wide variety of reforms was in-
troduced. Through negotiation or outright confiscation foreign ownership and
control were reduced to minimal levels by 1952. The Korean War provided an
opportunity to gain state control over all foreign trade, ban Hollywood movies,
and mount campaigns criticizing Western cultural influence in general,
although up until 1960, when the Sino-Soviet split occurred, Soviet cultural in-
fluence served as partial replacement. By the period we are concerned with,
then, there was very little foreign influence evident in Chinese urban life.
The most prominent institutional change carried out during the 1950s was
the transition to socialist property relations. As they came to power the Chinese
Communists seized control of major factories, banks, public utilities, and so
forth, but for a period privately owned factories and shops were allowed to con-
tinue to operate. But a series of political campaigns and administrative regula-
tions removed much of the autonomy of such enterprises, and in 1955-7 the
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private sector was almost totally eliminated, with only a small number of ped-
dlers and roving repairmen remaining outside of the socialist sector. By the late
1950s capitalism had been essentially eliminated from urban China.
The Chinese Communists were not so naive as to believe that simply
eliminating foreign influence and capitalist ownership would automatically
produce the new forms of urbanism they aspired to. They recognized that other
changes were needed and proceeded to carry them out. One of the most impor-
tant, and distinctive, was the set of migration controls that came fully into force
in about 1959. (Tien 1973) These restrictions essentially make it illegal for
anyone in the countryside to take up residence in any urban place unless
specifically given permission to do so (e.g., as a result of labor recruitment or
university enrollment). In addition, no person living in any urban place is sup-
posed to relocate in another urban place without specific approval. (Approval
to move to a smaller urban place is fairly easy to come by, but to a larger city is
extremely difficult. Even marriage to someone from a larger city does not enti-
tle you to establish a joint residence there.) These migration restrictions are
connected to a system of household registration enforced throughout the na-
tion, and valid registration in a locality is required to gain access to most urban
resources and opportunities (see below).
Of course, household registration systems are common in many countries,
and in the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries there have been
efforts to ban migration into certain large cities. What is distinctive about the
Chinese version is the attempt to use household registration not simply to keep
track of people, but to keep people at all levels from engaging in individually
initiated mobility, even into a rural town of only 10,000 people. Also distinc-
tive is the fact that urban registration is not regarded as a right but as a
privilege, and that this privilege can be lost. This has happened on repeated oc-
casions as various sectors of the urban population have been &dquo;mobilized&dquo; to
resettle in the countryside, the most famous instance being the 17 million ur-
ban graduates who were rusticated in the decade after 1968 (Bernstein 1977).
An additional set of measures was implemented in the effort to develop a
highly penetrating, grass-roots organizational system in urban China. Two
complementary systems were involved, one organized around territorial units,
the other around production units. In the former, each city is divided into
districts, and each district into neighborhoods or wards. At this level of the
hierarchy are located the ward government office and ward police station
whose salaried professionals supervise the lower levels of the hierarchy. Each
ward is, in turn, divided into residents’ committees which supervise 100-800
households, often those living on a city block or in several apartment buildings.
These are, in turn, divided into residents’ small groups supervising 15-40
households, generally those living along a lane or in a single building. These
are not voluntary community associations but organizations mandated by law
in 1954 (see Cohen 1968, Chap. 2), and the leaders of these lowest two levels
are local residents who are appointed or elected in &dquo;guided&dquo; elections run by
ward officials.
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These neighborhood organizations have a wide variety of roles they are
supposed to play, both providing services and insuring social control. The
ward may run workshops, nursery schools, bicycle repair shops and other
small facilities, and they carry out innoculations against diseases, organize
residents to sweep lanes and alleys, and may set up a reading room for retired
people and deliver coal to the infirm. In terms of social control the residents’
committees and small groups organize local people for political study meetings
of official propaganda, they may organize residents for night-time guard duty
and patrols of the neighborhood, they seasonally check each household for
cleanliness, and they are expected to alert the ward police to suspicious com-
ings and goings in the neighborhood, leading to surprise night-time searches of
homes. In general when the authorities want to enforce any new policy,
whether it be the campaign to send urban school graduates to the countryside
or to restrict urban families to having only one child, the authorities mobilize
this network to convene meetings, carry out visits to individual homes, and
otherwise pressure for universal compliance.
The work organization half of this administrative system has similar roles
to play. Work enterprises of course organize the daily routine of work, but they
also have many other functions. They organize their employees for after hours
political study meetings, local security patrols, cleanliness inspections, birth
control meetings, and so forth. Employees who commute to work fall under the
supervision of both neighborhood and work unit systems, but in large enter-
prises which provide housing, nursery schools, clinics and other facilities on the
premises, employees fall solely under the supervision of their employing unit.
Such cases bring to mind some parallels from other societies - an American
company town, the English &dquo;new towns,&dquo; or a Japanese high technology com-
pany. But the intrusiveness and inclusiveness of controls in the Chinese work
unit are arguably greater than in any of these cases from capitalist societies and
even in comparison with production enterprises in socialist Eastern Europe
(see Bater 1980; French and Hamilton 1979). Not only are attempts made to
preempt spontaneous associational life, but very personal decisions - whether
to marry, to have another baby, or to get divorced, for example - have first to
be referred to one’s work unit superiors for approval.
An additional set of institutional changes involved the effort to restrict
market forces and relationships to a substantial extent and substitute direct
bureaucratic allocation. In terms of employment, there was an effort to develop
a work assignment system and eliminate any sort of labor market. Labor
bureaus were established in cities and empowered to assign individuals leaving
school to jobs, and individuals were obliged to accept these jobs and remain
working at them unless they were transferred, even if the work did not suit
their preferences and skills. This system promoted a Chinese version of perma-
nent employment, or in terms of the local slang, &dquo;an iron rice bowl. &dquo;
Employees could expect that if they did not commit a serious crime or political
error they would not be laid off or fired, and even if they were transferred they
could expect comparable pay and benefits (Korzec and Whyte 1981). But an
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individual who cannot stand his job, has conflicts with his superiors, or feels
more suited to other work cannot simply quit and seek other employment,
since other enterprises are not supposed to hire people &dquo;off the street,&dquo; but
only through labor bureau allocations.’ An employee can request a transfer or
search for an individual elsewhere he can &dquo;swap&dquo; jobs with, but such in-
dividually initiated changes are so difficult to pull off that those who succeed in
doing so are looked upon as quite extraordinary. No East European socialist
country has attempted to limit the labor market to anything like this Degree,
although from 1940 to 1956 the Soviet Union did try to make job changes
illegal. As a consequence of this difference, phenomena such as high wage dif-
ferentials to attract workers to barren regions or difficult jobs and high labor
turnover are much more a feature of employment in socialist Eastern Europe
than in China.
Most housing is also bureaucratically allocated, at least in the largest
cities. In places like Peking and Shanghai there is a small share of private hous-
ing left, generally under 10 % of all housing space, but there appears to be little
market in such housing, which is mainly passed down and used within par-
ticular families. In large cities the bulk of housing is owned and controlled
through the two administrative systems already described - work units and
neighborhoods. So those in need of new or altered housing have to apply to
either their work unit or to district housing management offices for space.
There they have to satisfy particular bureaucratic criteria to qualify for hous-
ing, and those who qualify generally go on a waiting list. There they may re-
main for several years until space becomes available, with no private housing
market or access to building supplies to build their own home that could give
them an alternative. Here the Chinese case is generally similar to Eastern
Europe, although in many countries in the latter area it is more possible to
finance home construction individually or to subscribe to cooperative apart-
ment construction projects.
Even in food and consumer goods the role of the market has been
minimized in urban China. This has occurred through a very extensive system
of rationing. Many of the essentials of life require ration coupons or booklets of
various kinds in addition to cash, although the list has varied somewhat over
time and from city to city. Some of the things always or usually rationed are
rice, flour, cooking oil, cotton cloth, some synthetic fabrics, pork, eggs, fish,
sugar, powdered milk, beancurd, peanuts, some brands of cigarettes, coal,
soap, light bulbs, leather shoes, wristwatches, bicycles, sewing machines,
television sets, and major items of furniture (see White 1977). Some items, to
be sure, are not usually rationed - fresh vegetables, fruits, toys, dishes, for ex-
ample - but still the list is so extensive as to make it difficult to live in a city
unless one has the necessary ration coupons, which require at least a valid ur-
ban registration and often other criteria as well. In the 1950s some remaining
roving peddlers and &dquo;free markets&dquo; in cities where peasants could come to
market extra produce did provide alternatives to reliance on state stores and ra-
tioned goods, but during the Cultural Revolution efforts were made to stamp
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out these &dquo;remnants of capitalism,&dquo; resulting in nearly total dependence on
the official rationing and supply system.
Rationing is not unknown in other societies, but it has been a more
permanent and pervasive part of the Chinese system. In Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union, for example, rationing has generally been employed to cope
with temporary shortages of particular items and has been replaced by market
distribution (although at fixed state prices) as soon as supplies permitted. In
China some items, like grain products, continue to be rationed even when the
public generally perceives they are not in short supply, which suggests that
other goals of rationing besides coping with shortages are paramount in the
Chinese case - for example, restricting migration to the city, and preventing
unequal consumption within the city.
The emphasis on bureaucratic allocation is extended to other areas as well
in China. Health care, for example, is subject to a bureaucratic allocation
system, with no private medical care available and with individuals required to
go through the referral system attached to the work unit or neighborhood to
which they belong. Schooling worked similarly in these years, with no exam-
based competition for placement in the highest quality schools, but instead
movement up through assigned schools on the basis of administrative recom-
mendations. In general the extreme emphasis on bureaucratic allocation com-
bined with the efforts to stamp out the remnants of private property and
market trade that occurred in the Cultural Revolution decade created a system
of direct allocation by paternalistic state authorities that is quite distinctive
even in comparison with Eastern Europe.
Another set of changes sought to shift urban areas from a consumption to a
production emphasis. This effort had several dimensions. First, and foremost,
there was a reallocation of economic priorities which involved major invest-
ment in industry (especially heavy industry), construction, and human capital,
and a deemphasis on consumer goods and personal services. Some trades were
phased out or banned entirely (e.g., prostitutes, rickshaw drivers), certain
people in trades deemed too crowded (jewelry making, tailoring) were
transferred into other lines of work, and many small consumer-oriented shops
were consolidated into larger collectively financed or state-run stores. Another
dimension involved the effort to reduce the proportion of the urban population
that was dependent upon others, an effort pursued through a variety of means
- mobilizing housewives for work outside the home, sending &dquo;excess&dquo; ur-
banites down to the countryside, and fostering birth control, for example. In
many other ways a spartan and productive urban atmosphere was promoted.
Wedding feasts were discouraged, traditional holiday celebrations were
shortened or ignored, fairly uniform &dquo;proletarian&dquo; styles of dress were en-
couraged, stints of athletic competition and manual labor became regular parts
of life for all, and new plays and novels popularized the modest life styles of the
new age. These emphases differ only in degree from those that characterized
the Soviet Union in Stalin’s time, although since the 1950s a shift back partial-
ly in the direction of catering to consumer needs has been visible in much of
Eastern Europe.
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Another set of changes was designed to provide greater security for ur-
banites. This involved first an effort to eliminate inflation and then to enhance
security through the employment systems and rationing network already
described. Jobs in the state sector also brought with them an impressive range
of fringe benefits.3 One was eligible for full medical insurance for oneself and
partial medical insurance for dependents, sick leave pay, disability insurance,
paid maternity leave, retirement pensions, subsidized housing, and in many
cases even subsidies for things like busfare and haircuts. Also important were
the expansions of schooling and of medical care facilities that took place in
cities, which were designed to make urbanites feel that resources that had
formerly been used mainly by the wealthy were now within reach of all. These
measures do not differ in major ways from the &dquo;welfare state&dquo; emphasis com-
mon in socialist Eastern Europe.
A final set of institutional changes involved the effort to promote equality
among urbanites - both equality of opportunity and equality of results. These
efforts received particular emphasis during the Cultural Revolution decade.
On the one hand various kinds of bonuses, incentive payments, and royalties
were eliminated, placing employed persons on fixed wage scales. Although
their wage ranks remained significantly differentiated (with, for example, a
ratio of 3 to 1 between the pay of the highest grade factory worker and the
lowest grade - see Korzec and Whyte 1981), some people in the highest wage
ranges were demoted while wage increases were provided in 1971-2 for those at
the bottom, compressing the differentials somewhat. Symbols of status were
also attacked, and military ranks, graded titles (professor, assistant professor)
and so forth were eliminated. In most cases the former holders of such titles
continued to carry out their duties, and so company commanders could still
give orders to new army recruits. But some experiments were made with role
reversals, such as having doctors empty bedpans while nurses experimented
with surgery and orderlies gave injections. Many highly placed bureaucrats
and intellectuals had to move out of spacious housing into cramped quarters or
even into the countryside, while some of their former subordinates moved up
into the vacated premises (Whyte 1981).
Even more interesting were efforts to block the transmission of high status
from one generation to the next. It was recognized that children from well
educated families (families that often had &dquo;impure&dquo; class backgrounds as
former capitalists and merchants) had tended to do better and go further in
school, and thus get assigned to better jobs, than youths from less well
educated families, even long after the revolution. This is hardly a surprising
phenomenon even for a socialist society (see Connor 1979; Yanowitch and
Fisher 1973). Before 1966 a system of competitive examinations was utilized to
allocate students to the best schools and into the universities, as in many other
societies. The Cultural Revolution eliminated this. After 1968, when schools
reopened, students proceeded upward through designated neighborhood
primary and secondary schools without examinations, but it was no longer
possible to go directly from secondary school to college. Instead, secondary
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school graduates had to go out into society, either by being assigned an urban
job, joining the army, or going to the countryside. The latter was the fate of
most urban youths.
When universities began to reopen after 1970 they chose their new
students in a novel way - by recommendation from work units, communes,
or military units. Young people could express an interest in going to college,
but it was up to the local authorities to decide whom they would nominate, and
they were directed to consider criteria such as a youth’s class background,
work record, political activism, and relationships with fellow workers in order
to gauge worthiness for advanced education. Entrance examinations were not
used, and even the youth’s former academic record in secondary school was
not supposed to be a factor. Even those fortunate enough to be assigned to the
army or an urban job rather than rural rustication were to be selected by school
administrators in terms of their class background and political record, rather
than their academic credentials. By short-circuiting the connection between
academic performance in school and one’s later fate, the Cultural Revolution
radicals felt that they could provide the basis for greater equality of
opportunity.
Although there have been important egalitarian impulses in East Euro-
pean socialism - for example, in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and briefly
again under Khrushchev in the 1950s (Moore 1950s; Feldmesser 1962) - in
no instance was a set of reforms designed to dismantle meritocracy and
material rewards and strive for equality of opportunity and results pursued as
systematically as in China during the Cultural Revolution. Taken as a whole,
however, the Chinese approach to urbanism is best regarded as a variant of an
established socialist pattern, but one that goes much further in fostering
bureaucratic allocation, tight-knit organizational control, and egalitarianism.
I have noted that the Chinese elites who pushed these reforms anticipated
that by creating these altered institutional forms they would be creating the
conditions to make possible the elimination of previous urban &dquo;evils&dquo; and the
promotion of a highly committed, solidary, and involved style of urban social
life. How realistic were these expectations, though? Were the Maoists perhaps
engaged in a utopian struggle against certain imperatives of urbanism, as
Wirth might have argued? Do the claims for the successes of the &dquo;Maoist
model&dquo; of urbanism have any real basis? It is to these questions that I now
turn.
The Social Consequences of Urban Transformation
In many ways these institutional changes must be judged quite successful.
Let us consider some of the details. Clearly &dquo;overurbanization&dquo; has been
avoided. Indeed, although the economy has developed at a relatively rapid,
albeit uneven, pace since 1949, the proportion of the population living in ur-
ban areas has been kept more or less constant. Chinese sources claim that in
1953 about 13 % of the population lived in cities above 100,000 and that in
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Table 1
The Urban Population in Low Income Countries
* median, weighted by country population
Sources: China - Whyte and Parish 1983, Chap. 2.
Others - World Bank, World Development Report, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980.
1978 the comparable figure was still about 13 % (Orleans 1982). The cities that
have grown most rapidly have not been the largest coastal cities, as is common-
ly the case in the Third World, but medium-sized (100,000-1 million) cities in
the interior. Furthermore, China’s largest city, Shanghai, actually experienced
a decline for a period, from more than 7 million in 1957 to only about 6 million
in 1973 (Howe 1981). The people we interviewed generally confirmed the view
that it was exceedingly difficult for peasants to establish themselves in China’s
large cities without permission, and that there were very few such individuals
in the neighborhoods where they lived. Scholars such as Cur Ofer and Ivan
Szelenyi have argued that in general East European societies are &dquo;underur-
banized.&dquo; (Ofer 1976; Szelenyi 1981; Konrad and Szelenyi 1974) In other
words, they tend to have smaller proportions of their populations living in ur-
ban places than do capitalist societies at comparable levels of economic
development. The figures in Table 1 make it fairly clear that China also fits
this pattern of underurbanization.
The effort to make cities more productive has also been fairly successful.
For one thing, the percentage of the urban population employed increased
from about 30 % in the early 1950s to 55 % in the late 1970s, indicating a
dramatic drop in the number of non-wage earners who had to be supported by
their families or the state. (Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian 1981, p. VI-25) One trend
that contributed to this shift was the exodus of housewives from their homes
and into the workplace after the mid-1950s. We estimate from our interview
data that about 90 % of all urban women in the 20-50 age range were working
in full-time jobs in the mid-1970s. The figures in Table 2 reveal that this is an
impressively high rate of female employment, even in comparison with the
more developed societies of Eastern Europe.
Equally as clear are shifts in the distribution of nonagricultural employ-
ment in China. By 1957 socialism had been established and the Stalinist pat-
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Table 2
Percentage of Labor Force Female
Sources: China: Weighted sample of employed neighbors.
Others: Computed from non-agricultural labor force data in 1977 Yearbook of Labor
Statistics (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1977).
tern of economic priorities had already produced a clear shift in favor of fields
like heavy industry and construction. Still, in the two decades after 1957, a fur-
ther shift in the same direction occurred (see Table 3), which even more deem-
phasized services other than education and health care. In Table 4 the conse-
quences of these shifts can be seen in comparative perspective. There we see
that, in spite of China’s much lower level of economic development, the profile
of nonagricultural employment looks quite similar to that in Eastern Europe,
and quite different from that found in developed capitalist economies or in the
Third World. These statistics attest to a contrast that is clear even to casual
observers who visit cities such as Hong Kong, Singapore, or Taipei, and then
cities in the PRC. In place of the untidy profusion of tourist shops, street-
corner trinket sellers, and attractions to the palate ranging from roving snack
sellers to magnificently decorated restaurants, visitors to Chinese cities in the
mid-1970s could see a narrow range of drab but functional stores, canteens,
and workshops, all overshadowed by major factory complexes nearby.
Considerable success was also achieved in promoting stability and solidari-
ty. The combination of factors such as lifetime employment, bureaucratic con-
trols on changing jobs and housing, and obligatory participation in grassroots
meetings and activities promoted social relations quite different from the
Wirthian image of impersonality and anonymity. We calculated that the
average length of residence in one place of family heads in the weighted sample
from our interviews was 18 years, an impressive testimonial to the stability of
social networks since 1949.’’ The fact that large numbers of families are forced
to share kitchens and toilets with their neighbors also increases familiarity,
although not necessarily solidarity. We found that our interviewees showed a
range of knowledge about their nearest neighbors that would be hard to im-
agine in America or most other societies, and this familiarity about such things




The Non-Agricultural Labor Force by Industry and Year
Sources: Statistical Bureau, Statistical Work in New China (Beijing, November 1979), adapted by
John Philip Emerson, &dquo;Growth of Nonagricultural Employment in the People’s
Republic of China,&dquo; paper delivered at the conference on China’s population,
Hawaii, May 1980.
was what made our research possible. And although the people we interviewed
had decided for a variety of reasons to leave China and come to Hong Kong,
almost without exception they said that ties among neighbors and workmates
were closer and characterized by more &dquo;human feelings&dquo; in the cities where
they had lived than in Hong Kong, where they saw social relations fitting the
Wirthian stereotypes quite closely.
This interpersonal familiarity is partly, as noted, a consequence of the
penetrating organizational system that was built up in work units and
neighborhoods, and the success of this system in exerting social control is also
impressive. Activities that were seen as rampant social evils before 1949 -
e.g., prostitution, crime, secret society extortion, gambling - were, if not
totally eliminated, at least sharply reduced in scale. So, for example, observers
accustomed to the round-the-clock din of mah-jong tiles in Hong Kong or the
zeal with which Chinese flock to the casinos in Macao find it remarkable that
what seemed like a national craze for gambling has been reduced to occasional
furtive card games between close friends behind closed doors in the PRC.
Other examples of the success of the authorities in producing major changes in
behavior patterns can also be pointed out - the ability to mobilize 17 million
urban youths to settle down in the countryside, or to induce parents in a highly
pro-natalist culture to limit themselves to two children or even one. On a more
72
Table 4
The Non-Agricultural Labor Force by Industry
and Type of Economy < a >
< a > Except for China, all about 1970.
< b > Twelve societies with 1970 per capita GNP of less than $1,200, ranging from the poorest,
India, to the richest, Argentina.
< c > Four states - East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
Sources: China - table 3. U.S. - U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.,
1976 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), table 597. Others -
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1972 New York, 1973), table 10, and
Demographic Yearbook, 1973 (New York, 1974), table 40.
mundane level, in any other society it is hard to imagine the 1972 scene of
Peking residents rousted out in the middle of the night to sweep the new-fallen
snow off the streets President Nixon would traverse the next day.
The pursuit of security also made clear progress. Inflation was brought
under control by about 1951, and over the years not only was an increasing
proportion of the urban population employed (producing higher family in-
comes even with no change in wage levels), but more and more worked in the
state sector of the economy where they were entitled to the wide range of fringe
benefits previously noted. Widespread begging and squatter settlements disap-
peared, and the extensive rationing system eliminated hoarding in the most
basic commodities. Schools and health care facilities grew rapidly and were in-
creasingly seen as within reach of all urbanites, rather than monopolized by the
wealthy. In certain respects, though, living standards increased quite slowly.
For example, while the worst slum areas were cleared, the Stalinist emphasis
on productive investments resulted in little being spent on new housing after
the mid-1950s, so that much urban housing decayed into a seedy condition and
actual living space per person declined. Still, most of the urban population
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Table 5
Income Inequality by Type of Household and Society
Sources: China - Sample of neighbor households.
Other societies - Shail Jain, Size Di,rtribution of Income (Washington, D.C.: Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1975).
Notes: (1) The data for the other countries is for the urban population while the Chinese
figures are for the non-agricultural population, but this should make little difference in
the results, judging from non-agricultural data in Jain.
(2) All figures describe the distribution of households by total household income in
each country or set of countries.
< a > Twenty-four market societies with a 1970 per capita gross national product of less than
U.S. $1200 and population greater than one million.
could at least take comfort from the fact that most of the economic insecurities
of urban life had been eliminated.
The efforts made to foster greater equality in urban areas are especially in-
teresting. It is often argued that incomes tend to be modestly more equally
distributed in socialist than in capitalist societies, but that many forms of ine-
quality remain, and that leading bureaucrats and intellectuals have access to a
wide range of special privileges, and their children manage to do quite well also
(see, for example, Connor 1979; Szelenyi 1978). The Chinese elite, or at least
the Maoist elements during the Cultural Revolution, wanted to do better than
this. We get some idea of the results of their efforts by examining the figures in
Table 5. From Table 5 one can see that our estimate of income distribution for
urban China in the mid-1970s shows somewhat more equality than in any of
the comparison countries. It is interesting to note, however, that the &dquo;best&dquo; of
these other cases is Taiwan, where a capitalist economy operating in a Chinese
context does not show significantly more inequality of incomes than in urban
areas of the PRC.
But if it is true that in a socialist society bureaucratic allocation makes rank
more important than income in determining access to scarce goods and ser-
vices, then perhaps income distribution comparisons are not so relevant. We
collected some data on the consumption of various consumer durables, and in
Figure 1 we can examine whether consumption levels were closely related to
occupational rank in the 1970s. Although we have no basis here for com-
parisons with other countries, in general the plots in Figure 1 do not appear to
be particularly steep. Only in regard to the scarcest items, television sets and
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Fig. 1. Occupational Rank and Consumption.
* Watches and Bicycles are indexed on the right side, others on the left
1-Hi~h professionals 4-Managerial cadres 7-Service workers
2-Administrative cadres 5-Clerical & sales 8-Ordinary & semi-skilled
3-Low professionals 6-Skilled manual 9-Unskilled & marginal
cameras, do high professionals show a clear advantage. Otherwise consump-
tion levels do not seem to be tied closely to occupational rank. These figures
suggest relative equality of consumption as well as incomes in urban China.5 5
Even more intriguing are the data we collected on educational and occupa-
tional mobility, which are presented in Table 6. There we can see quite dif-
ferent patterns for the cohorts who reached age 20 before the Cultural Revolu-
tion and afterward. In the pre-1966 cohort the familiar pattern of youths with
advantaged fathers doing better than other youths is visible. (The figures show,
incidentally, that offspring of parents with &dquo;impure&dquo; class backgrounds con-
tinued to do better than the children of workers, soldiers, and poor peasants
during this period.) In this earlier cohort about a third of the variance in
schooling and jobs is explained by the other variables listed. In the post-1967
cohort, in contrast, the links between the father’s characteristics and the child’s s
success largely disappear, as does the advantage of sons over daughters, for the





















































a ro S-< ~ &dquo;’C ro ¡:: ~ ...- 13 P-. ron &dquo; jcC1 .. U
~ I 8









::::: >-~ 00 0 ¡::O
..... ~ g
o E ...- ø ;:3 P-.
Sj= 8




c -0 sX.ti &copy;
~ S ~<c3~1I d~ x =~M u o)4’l .
~ ~ ~ 2!!i!~l/~ &dquo;<v
..Ufl~S-< 8/B /B p..
3 ~ ~ *
~ v v
76
&dquo;predictable, &dquo; as the lower values of R-squared show. These figures make it
appear, then, that the changes in the systems of schooling and job-placement
that resulted from the Cultural Revolution largely eliminated the advantages
of young people from high status families. (Again, however, our figures do not
speak to the fate of children of those of the most exalted ranks - see footnote
5.) Coleman (1974) once argued that &dquo;family effects&dquo; on school performance
were so pervasive that the only way to really insure equality of opportunity
would be to take infants away their families and rear them in some sort of
uniform manner. Our figures suggest that the Cultural Revolution alternative
of eliminating the role of the schools in social mobility largely overcame these
&dquo;family effects,&dquo; at least for a period.
In many respects, then, urban areas in China had been fundamentally
transformed after 1949. By the mid-1970s they differed in appearance, com-
position, and organizational forms from the urban areas captured by the CCP
only a generation earlier. In many ways the changes were successful in pro-
moting forms of urbanism that conformed to the values of the communist elite,
and which differed in important regards from the prevailing images of ur-
banism in Western sociology. In some respects the result was that Chinese
cities became quite similar to cities in socialist Eastern Europe, and quite
unlike cities elsewhere in the Third World, making it clear that any simple
equating of forms of urbanism with levels of development is untenable. But in
a number of significant respects - particularly in regard to controlling city
growth, fostering population stability, developing a penetrating organizational
system, and promoting equality of opportunity - the &dquo;Maoist model&dquo; of ur-
banism appears distinctive even in regard to Eastern Europe. Given these ap-
parent successes in developing distinctive urban forms, it is interesting to note
that China’s post-Mao leadership has begun to attack and modify a number of
the features of this Maoist model. In the following pages I wish to analyze the
reasons for these attacks and the nature of the modifications now taking place.
The Retreat from the Maoist model
China’s post-Mao leadership has operated in a state of perceived crisis and
has used this atmosphere to repudiate many of the policies of the Cultural
Revolution and even to question some of the institutional changes made in
earlier years. In part this is simply an old story of a victorious faction trying to
undo the work of their enemies, but it is also clear that the urban innovations
introduced in the preceding period had unanticipated and harmful conse-
quences. What, specifically, went wrong?
First, and perhaps foremost, the original conception of Chinese socialist
urbanism was based on the idea that each urban youth could look forward to
getting educated and being assigned to a secure urban job, but that expectation
could no longer be met in the 1960s and 1970s. The baby boom of the 1950s,
the emphasis on the capital-intensive sector of the economy, and some signifi-
cant downturns in the economy (notably after the failure of the Great Leap
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Forward campaign of 1958-60) all combined to produce a situation in which
there were many more school-leavers each year than there were new urban
jobs available. (Factors such as the relative youth of the urban labor force and
Cultural Revolution restrictions on private enterprise aggravated the
problem.) By the early 1960s, urban unemployment, apparently brought
under control in the late 1950s, began to mushroom again.
The solution adopted by the authorities was to &dquo;deport&dquo; unemployed
youths to the countryside. But the 17 million urban youths who were rusticated
did not, unfortunately, end up contentedly working in the countryside. Large
numbers of them began to sneak back to the cities illegally. Without urban
registrations they were unable to work legally, but unlike a true rural migrant
they had families and friends who could help them survive in the city. With no
stake in the urban system and a certain invisibility owing to not being
recognized members of work units or neighborhoods, these youths in many
cases turned to black marketeering, picking pockets, robbery, and similar
kinds of deviance. Eventually some coalesced into juvenile gangs that engaged
in ritualized battles for &dquo;turf&dquo; with rival gangs, using zip-guns and other
makeshift weapons. So for urbanites accustomed to thinking that socialism
meant improved law and order, there was an alarming rise in crime.
Unemployment and juvenile delinquency were parts of the more general
problem of a lack of predictable opportunities for young people. The Maoist
reforms may have fostered equality of opportunity, but they also made urban
youths see their prospects in life as both dim and unpredictable. They could
gain access to schooling, to be sure, but no matter how hard they studied or ap-
plied themselves in other ways they knew that upon graduation they would
probably be assigned to the countryside. On the other hand, no matter how
poor their school performance or even the regularity of their attendance, they
knew that they would be promoted from year to year until graduation. So
much of the connection between present performance in school and future op-
portunities was removed, and student motivations and academic quality plum-
meted.
Not only young people but the entire urban work force was affected to one
degree or another by the dismantling of the incentive structure and career lad-
ders that had previously existed. Employed urbanites found their wages frozen
and bonus payments gone, and they also knew that if they worked poorly or
took sick leave they would continue to receive their fixed wages as usual. So
absenteeism, pilfering, and shoddy work increased during the Cultural
Revolution. As a result of the poor productivity of the work force, the
authorities found they had to invest at an increasingly high rate just to main-
tain an acceptable pace of growth. So instead of finding that the Maoist
reforms released untapped energies of &dquo;the masses,&dquo; critics charged that they
made economic development unnecessarily expensive.
Consumer frustrations also abounded in this period. The presumption
behind the bureaucratic allocation system was that urbanites would be able to
satisfy their basic needs at modest costs and could perhaps gradually enjoy an
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improved standard of living. But in fact urbanites with their wages frozen
found it difficult to cope with family needs even in the absence of inflation,
especially if they had unemployed or rusticated children to support. As noted
earlier, the prevailing investment priorities led to a decline (by 20 % ) in the
housing space per capita between the early 1950s and the late 1970s (see Zhou
1979), and the inability of urbanites to arrange for better accommodations
became a special sore point. Goods were also not always available, even with
the rationing system, making it necessary to spend long hours in lines to buy
needed food and other items. Again the prevailing production emphasis meant
that families had to cope with laundry, cooking, and other onerous chores with
little help from appliances or public service facilities, and as a result the one
day off per week of urban workers often was swallowed up by work on such
chores. Indeed, one recent Chinese time-budget study argues that Chinese ur-
banites have to spend about 50 % more time per day on chores than do people
even in other socialist societies (Wang and Li 1982).
The bureaucratic obstacles and delays involved in the pursuit of scarce
goods, new housing, medical care, and other resources produced constant
frustrations. But they also brought out the resoucefulness of the Chinese, who
could use the &dquo;back door&dquo; of personal connections to gain access to goods and
services otherwise not available. Everyone was forced to play this game, and
people with particular access to such resources - e.g., doctors, shop clerks,
and housing office cadres - became very popular. But as a consequence of the
ubiquity of &dquo;going by the back door, &dquo; popular faith in the efficiency and equi-
ty of the official distribution system was undermined. Since those in the best
position to use the distribution system to their own advantage were the high
ranking bureaucrats and party cadres, urbanites began to perceive that their
frustrations were the product of the ample &dquo;back doors&dquo; of those in high
places. Since the resources involved ranged all the way from purchasing fresh
fish to gaining university admission for a son or daughter, it is easy to under-
stand the depths of the resentment engendered. The post-Mao leadership
recognized that, as in Poland, consumer frustrations and the hypocritical con-
trast between egalitarian ideology and special privileges of the elite can be
politically explosive, and they felt that some changes had to be made.
Further problems were associated with the heavy stress on bureaucratic
allocation and the related high degree of corporateness promoted in urban
organizational life. While it had been hoped that such features would produce
solidarity and security, and as a result lead to high productivity and activist
participation in political affairs, the reality was often quite different. In the
absence of technical standards for evaluating behavior and of material incen-
tives, the authorities increasingly used political slogans, praise, and threats to
mobilize subordinates, and all realms of thought and behavior came to be seen
in terms of ideological virtue or deviation. To this was added the growing fac-
tional struggles that accompanied the period leading up to Mao’s death in
1976. As a result urbanites found themselves in increasing danger of being
politically victimized, often for trivial causes or out of personal spite or fac-
tional intrigue.
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In this sort of atmosphere the understandable response of many was to try
to do whatever was necessary to stay out of trouble, but not to stick one’s neck
out and attract attention. So a style of ritualized compliance, rather than ac-
tivist involvement, was fostered. Currying favor with superiors became com-
mon, but it was a risky game, since one’s patron today might be purged tomor-
row. These interpersonal tensions were made more complex by the legacy of
the system of permanent employment. Being unable to move to different jobs,
some people found themselves locked into daily interaction with others who
had denounced them (or vice versa) ten or twenty years earlier. Long
suppressed personal animosities came to the surface and were expressed under
the campaigns and slogans of the Cultural Revolution decade. In sum, the
economic security that had been gained was to a considerable degree offset by
the political insecurities that developed during these years.
By the mid-1970s, then, a number of behavioral tendencies that were seen
as undesirable - passive compliance, sycophancy, forming of personalized
factions - were clearly being fostered. Equally important were the conse-
quences of the institutional changes for those in positions of authority. The
Cultural Revolution has been seen by many, in the West as well as in China,
as profoundly anti-bureaucratic in thrust, designed to foster humility on the
part of superiors and active involvement and criticism of abuses of power by
subordinates (see, for example, Whyte 1973). Again the reality was often far
different. The lack of autonomy and alternatives forced subordinates into near-
total subservience toward those who ran their organizations, and those in
power found they could use their sycophantic subordinates to a number of
ends, including struggle with declared factional opponents and the quest for
personal advantage. As a consequence, the prevailing organizational system
fostered bureaucratic arrogance and abuses of power, rather than the desired
humble public servant orientation (see also Walder 1982). But one way
organizational leaders did not use their authority was to pursue organizational
goals innovatively. Since they were, in turn, locked into a politicized and fac-
tionalized environment in relation to their own bureaucratic superiors, they
tended to employ the same sorts of risk-minimization strategies that were used
by their subordinates. Given the highly bureaucratic nature of the ad-
ministrative system, with many levels of &dquo;chops&dquo; needed to approve any new
activity, the result was to increase further preexisting tendencies toward
bureaucratic immobilism.
Thus, while the urban reforms introduced by the CCP transformed the
nature of urban society and successfully combatted many perceived &dquo;evils of
urbanism,&dquo; at the same time they generated a range of new and serious pro-
blems. Instead of the promised solidary and orderly urban environment, ur-
banites in the 1970s increasingly perceived that they were living in an arbitrary
bureaucratic system that only irregularly met their needs, an environment in
which one had to play all the angles and cultivate personal ties to maintain
security and gain access to resources. In this sort of setting, when individuals
felt frustated or abused, they were not likely to blame their own failings, the
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vagaries of the market, or simply fate. Instead they were likely to blame the
Party and state which claimed to be benevolently providing for them. Hence,
China’s post-Mao leaders felt that they were faced with an authority crisis that
was due in substantial part to the policies and institutions of the Cultural
Revolution. This provided the justification for the attacks on the Maoist model
of urbanism and the reforms that have been introduced since 1977. A full
discussion of these reforms is not possible here, but a simple enumeration of
some of the most important changes should convey their thrust.
The post-Mao leaders have taken a wide variety of steps to renounce
solidary egalitaranism and to restore competitive meritocracy. Examinations,
grades, and academic competition for placement in high quality &dquo;keypoint&dquo;
schools and universities have become the rule. The program of sending urban
youths to the countryside is being phased out, and efforts are underway to em-
phasize light industry, collective enterprises, and even private enterprise in an
effort to combat the unemployment problem. For the first time in more than a
generation foreign firms are being invited to set up enterprises in China as part
of a strategy to acquire new technology and expand the number of available
jobs. Once employed, urbanites now find a complex structure of bonuses,
piece rates, and other material incentive devices back in vogue, and are told
that diligent efforts now will lead to promotions in the future. Large numbers
of specialists who had been working at jobs for which they were not trained are
being transferred to work more appropriate to their talents, and intellectuals
are being offered a wide range of benefits in regard to housing and working
conditions in order to stimulate their efforts. These policies are all designed to
rebuild a predictable opportunity structure that ties current behavior to future
rewards and emphasizes expertise over political virtue. If in the process
somewhat greater differentials in income and consumption are fostered, and
even inheritance of advantages, the post-Mao leaders are on record as saying
that this is acceptable, or even desirable, as part of the modernization effort
(see Whyte 1981).
At the same time the government has taken steps to remedy problems in
the distribution system. By reforming rural production organizations in a com-
parable incentive-oriented way, allowing peasant &dquo;free markets&dquo; in the cities,
encouraging free enterprise activity, and investing more in consumer goods in-
dustries and in urban housing, the authorities aim to increase the availability
of supplies and reduce consumer frustations. At the same time they have in-
stituted new disciplinary procedures and have publicized cases of graft and cor-
ruption, including the executions increasingly used to combat &dquo;economic
crimes,&dquo; all as part of the effort to restore faith in the distribution system.
A number of efforts are also underway to reduce the fear of political vic-
timization. For the first time since 1949 a comprehensive legal system is being
introduced, and citizens are being assured that there will be equality before the
law. Large numbers of authority figures who are said to have abused their posi-
tions have been purged, but the population is being told that no large-scale
political struggle campaigns will occur in the future. Many individuals who ran
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afoul of the authorities in the previous period have now been &dquo;rehabilitated,&dquo;
and the populace is being told that class origin labels will no longer be used to
discriminate against those from &dquo;bad class&dquo; families. Various mechanisms for
selecting and promoting officials based upon qualifications and contributions,
rather than on political background or simply seniority are being experimented
with. And a range of experiments in decentralizing decision-making, relying
more heavily on market forces, using profitability rather than physical targets
to judge success, and allowing some retention of profits locally are being tried
in an effort to break the rigid bureaucratic constraints within which grass-roots
enterprises have had to operate.
Conclusions
To many observers the post-Mao changes seem drastic indeed, amounting
to a near total repudiation of the Maoist models of social organization that
emerged during the Cultural Revolution. When examined in detail, however,
the changes to date are neither unprecedented nor very far-reaching. Students
of East European socialism understandably have a sense of deja-vu when hear-
ing of these post-Mao reforms. For although the Chinese had developed some
rather distinctive institutions and policies, still the effort to reform the highly
bureaucratic &dquo;command economy&dquo; to provide the complexity and flexibility
needed in a modernizing economy is a familiar story. More specifically, the ef-
fort to reduce problems of bureaucratism, poor productivity, lines and short-
ages, and caprice of authorities by experimenting with administrative decen-
tralization, legal codes, market mechanisms, increased tolerance for private
enterprise, and growing autonomy for managers and intellectuals all have clear
parallels in the reform efforts begun in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in
the 1950s.
If the Eastern European precedent is our standard of comparison, then it
should also be clear that the post-Mao reforms to date involve much less exten-
sive changes than in countries such as Hungary and Yugoslavia, and
something more on the order of the partial and &dquo;two steps forward, one step
back&dquo; reforms implemented elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In a sense the
Chinese reforms involve a repudiation of the extreme egalitarianism of the late-
Mao era, but in other respects represent more a return to a conventional com-
mand economy rather than a dismantling of direct allocation in favor of market
prices and market-based distribution. Many features of the urban organiza-
tional system discussed earlier remain much the same as before. For example,
urban migration restrictions remain very much in force, prices continue to be
centrally fixed for most products, and urbanites still depend heavily upon
resources controlled by the authorities in the tightly-organized work units and
neighborhoods in which they work and live. There have been &dquo;trial balloon&dquo;
proposals that individuals be allowed to change jobs at their own discretion or
build their own private homes, but so far such proposals seem very controver-
sial and of questionable practicality in China’s urban system. Hence, I would
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argue that the extensive series of post-Mao reforms involves for the most part
little more than tinkering with the basic urban organizational forms built up in
the 1950s.
The foregoing observations lead me to argue that what we see here is not
some sort of triumph of rationality over Maoist utopianism, but one more in-
stance of a general set of dilemmas or tradeoffs involved in the process of
development, whether under socialist or capitalist auspices. This set of
tradeoffs has been discussed by others in terms of equality versus efficiency,
politics versus markets, or similar phrases (see Okun 1975; Lindblom 1977; see
also Stinchcombe 1959 and Walder 1981). An emphasis on features such as
markets, efficiency, and individual choice may result in flexible administra-
tion, high productivity, organizational innovation, and responsiveness to con-
sumer demands, although none of these is automatically guaranteed. But by
the same token such emphases may also entail inflation, unemployment, con-
spicuous consumption, transmission of privilege, and other perceived &dquo;evils.&dquo;
An emphasis on direct allocation, bureaucratic control, and equality, on the
other hand, has a different set of benefits and costs. Relative equality, stable
prices, and effective regulation of undesirable behavior may be fostered, but at
the same time bureaucratic rigidity, inefficiency, consumer frustration, and ar-
bitrary victimization tend to be unwanted byproducts.
Seen in this context, the Chinese Communists are swinging on a familiar
pendulum. They developed a set of institutions and policies that stressed
bureaucratic allocation and equality to an unusual extent, and now the costs of
that choice have led them to backtrack and search for a more &dquo;mixed&dquo; set of
organizational orientations that will reduce those costs. Even this modest swing
of the pendulum backward has generated controversy. Inflation surged up-
ward in 1980 after a generation under control, complaints were voiced against
the harsh competition and special privileges entailed by the new meritocratic
emphasis, and critics charged that foreign influences and ideas were subverting
society and leading to alienation, sexual experimentation, and crime. Perhaps
more important, it is probable that the millions of bureaucrats who rose into
positions of power largely on the basis of political credentials during the
previous generation will not be eager to see individuals with academic creden-
tials or technical skills move up past or displace them. In sum, many of the
kinds of resistance and obstacles that have stymied or even rolled back decen-
tralizing reforms in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland are clearly
visible in China, and it remains to be seen whether these can be overcome or
not.
What does my analysis of the Chinese case tell us about theories of ur-
banism ? Neither the Wirthian view of urban universals nor the neo-Marxist
analysis seems adequate to interpret the Chinese case. The characteristics
focussed on by Wirth and his followers do not appear to be inevitable con-
comitants of urbanism, and they do seem to have their roots at least in part in
the market exchange systems that exist in developed capitalist societies. When
the Chinese Communists set out to transform their cities they did succeed in
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producing social relationships that were at least in significant ways different
from the prevailing image of impersonal, cash-oriented urban relationships.
But contrary to the neo-Marxian view, development of socialist cities did not
necessarily lead to an elimination of all of the urban ills of capitalism -
unemployment, for example, proved difficult to eradicate. At the same time
the new urban forms that were built engendered their own serious problems,
which in the eyes of the post-Mao leaders made some elements of capitalist ur-
banism seem not so bad after all. So while there may not be invariant features
of urbanism, there may be universal tradeoffs that have to be faced. Efforts to
avoid one set of problems may engender a different set, and in the end planners
and political leaders are left trying to decide which combination of institutional
virtues and defects they are best able to live with. Can a system that can
eliminate prostitution avoid political persecution? Can world-quality science
be fostered without at the same time creating a high degree of inequality? The
situation in China in the early 1980s was still in flux, and the eventual formula
for dealing with these dilemmas of urbanism was still under debate.
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NOTES
1 Much of the data used to make specific comparisons comes from interviews conducted joint-
ly with William Parish in Hong Kong in 1977-78 with 133 former residents of cities in
China. In particular, we will utilize data on a sample of households of neighbors who lived
near our informants, and on a weighted neighbor household sample that is designed to com-
pensate for the mismatch between the urban places from which our informants came and
the distribution of urban places by size in China. For details on the specifics of our methods,
how data derived from our sample compare with official Chinese statistics, and how we
have dealt with various problems of bias in our interviews, consult the methodological ap-
pendices in our forthcoming volume, Urban Life in Contemporary China, (1983). Many of the
issues discussed in this paper are treated in greater detail in that same volume.
2 There is a system of hiring temporary workers for construction or other physical labor jobs
around the enterprise that doesn’t have to go through the labor bureaus, but these low
status jobs are a minor part of the employment system and do not constitute an attractive
alternative for those already in state employment. In subsequent paragraphs there are
similar minor exceptions to some of the general patterns I discuss, but I would argue that
these do not contradict the overall contours of the institutional system.
3 About 20% of non-agricultural employment in China involves work in "collective" rather
than state enterprises. Collective enterprises are often relatively small workshops and
service facilities that are not on the state budget, and which are responsible for their own
profits and losses. Employees in some well-endowed collective enterprises receive fringe
benefits that are similar in range to those enjoyed by employees in state firms, but in other
collective enterprises they receive much less, or even nothing at all besides their wages.
4 This figure is misleading in one respect. It ignores the fact that significant portions of the ur-
ban population may be sent to live in the countryside for a period, and then allowed to
return later. Such temporary moves were ignored in this computation. There are also no
good comparative statistics, or figures on China before 1949, to compare this figure with,
although it obviously contrasts with the often-cited figure that the average American family
moves once every five years. For details on an attempted comparison with India, which
shows more mobility of the urban population there than in China, see Whyte and Parish
1983, Chap. 2.
5 I should note, however, that our urban household sample included only one person who
falls in the category Chinese term "high-ranking cadre" &mdash; those of rank 13 and above in
the official state cadre hierarchy. So it is entirely possible that there is a very small urban
elite which would not bulk large in any general urban sample such as ours that does enjoy a
particularly advantaged living standard. In other words, the small size of this specially
privileged group may make Figure 1 a poor test of its existence, and the advantages of such
a group might have a large impact on public opinion in spite of their small numbers. See the
discussion to follow.
